Research

Books

  1.  Economics of Governance. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics (edited), Edward Elgar, 2017.
  2. Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Co-edited with Barry Weingast, Oxford University Press, 2006.
    • Translated into Chinese (forthcoming)
  3. Economic Foundations of Law and Organization, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
  4. Readings in the Economic Analysis of Law. (edited)  Blackwell, 2003.
    • Translated into Chinese by Li Su, 2006, Law Press China
  5. The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are  Efficient, University of Chicago Press, 1995.
    • “American Political Science Association: Best Book or Article in Political Economy-1994, 1995 or 1996” Translated into Portuguese by Alvaro de Sa and Renata E. A. de Lima.
    • O Mito do Fracas da Democracia, Bertrand Brasil, 1999.
    • Translated into Japanese by Katsuyoshi Okui 2003.
  6. The Federalist Papers: The New institutionalism and the Old, co-edited with B.Grofman,  Agathon Press, 1989

Articles in Journals

  1. “The University of California Was Wrong to Abolish the SAT: Admissions When Affirmative Action Was Banned,” Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 2024.  
  2. “District vs At-Large Voting: When district voting results in worse policy for minorities,” European Journal of Political Economy, 2024. 
  3. “Average Rank and Adjusted Rank are better Measures of College Success than is GPA,” Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, Winter 2022.
  4. “Darwinian Depression” Journal of Affective Disorders, October 2014.
  5. “Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions” British Journal of Political Science, October 2014. Reprinted in Economics of Governance
  6. “How pressure groups activate voters and move candidates closer to the median” Economic Journal, (2009). Reprinted in Economics of Governance
  7. “Bargaining in the shadow of war: when is a peaceful resolution most likely?” American Journal of Political Science 53:588-602, 2009.
  8. “Why Theory Choosing is better than Hypothesis Testing” Homo Oeconomicus, 543-549. ( 2009).
  9. “Is Status-quo bias consistent with downward sloping demand curves?” Economic Inquiry, 46: 283-288, (2008).
  10. “Targeted information and strategic behavior by uninformed voters” Economics of Governance, 9:87-100. (2008).
  11. “Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising” European Journal of Political Economy, 23: 360-378, (2007).
  12. “Litigation with two-sided incomplete information and symmetric bargaining” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23: 98-126, (2007).
  13. “The Power and the glory of the median voter: Reply to Caplan” Economic Journal Watch, (2005).
  14. “On the methodology of testing for voter irrationality:  A response to ‘From Friedman to Wittman'” Economic Journal Watch, 2005.
  15. “The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis and Psychological Advice Kyklos, 2005. Reprinted in Economics of Governance 
  16. “Valence Characteristics, Costly Policy and the Median-Crossing Property: A Diagrammatic Exposition” Public Choice, (2005).
  17. “Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis,”American Law and Economic Review, (2003)
  18. “Implementation with Partial Verification,” with Nirvikar Singh, Review of Economic Design, 63-84 (2001)
  19. “Contests Where There is Variation in the Size of Effort,”with Nirvikar Singh, Economic Theory, 711-744 (2001).
  20. “The Size and Wealth of Nations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 868-884 (2000).
  21. “Learning Liability Rules,” with D. Friedman, S. Crevier and A. Braskin, Journal of Legal Studies,145-164 (1997)
  22. “Why Voters Vote for Incumbents but Against Incumbency: A Rational Choice Explanation,” with D. Friedman, Journal of Public Economics, 67-83 (1995)
  23. “Nash Equilibrium vs. Maximin: A Comparative Game Statics Analysis,” European Journal of Political Economy, (1993) Reprinted in Donald A Walker (Ed.) Equilibrium. Edgar Elgar Publishers, 2000.
  24. “Nations and States: Mergers and Acquisitions; Dissolutions and Divorce,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (1991).
  25. “Arms Control and other Games Involving Imperfect Detection,”American Political Science Review, 923-948 (1989)
  26. “Why Democracies are Efficient,” Journal of Political Economy, 1395-1424 (1989).  Reprinted in C. Rowley (ed.) Public Choice Theory, Edward Elgar Publisher (1993).
  27. “Pressure Group Size and the Politics of Income Redistribution,” Social Choice and Welfare, 275-286 (1989)
  28. “Dispute Resolution and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data,” Journal of Legal Studies, 313-352 (1988).
  29. “Economic Contests with Incomplete Information and Optimal Contest Design,” with Nirvikar Singh, 34 Management Science, 528-540 (1988).
  30. “Final Offer Arbitration,” Management Science, 1551-1561 (1986)
  31. “The Price of Negligence,” Journal of Law and Economics, 151-163 (1986)
  32. “Counter-intuitive Results in Game Theory,” European Journal of Political Economy, 77-89 (1985).
  33. “Should Compensation be Based on Cost or Benefit?” International Review of Law and Economics, 173-185 (1985).
  34. “Pigovian Taxes which Work in the Small Number Case,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,144-154 (1985).
  35. “Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?” Journal of Legal Studies, 185-214 (1985).
  36. “Multicandidate Equilibria,” Public Choice, 287-291 (1984).
  37. “The Geometry of Justice,” Theory and Decision, 239-250 (1984).
  38. “Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?” Journal of Legal Studies, 57-80 (1984).
  39. “Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis,” American Political Science Review, 142-157 (1983).
  40. “A Comparison of Regulation and Liability Rules Under Imperfect Information,”  with M. White, Journal of Legal Studies, 413-426 (1983). Reprinted in Kathleen Segerson (ed.) Economics and Liability for Environmental Problems, Ashgate Publishing,
  41. “The Peak Income Hypothesis: An Econometric Reinvestigation’ Review of Economics and Statistics, 357-360 (1983)
  42. “Pollution Taxes and Optimal Spatial Location,” with M. White, Economica, 297-311 (1982).
  43. “Efficient Rules of Thumb in Highway Safety and Sporting Activity,”American Economic Review, 78-90 (1982) Reprinted in D. Wittman (ed.) Readings in the Economic Analysis of Law, Blackwell, 2003.
  44. “Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games,” with S. Brams, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 39-62 (1981).
  45. “Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages and Related Doctrines in the Law,” Journal of Legal Studies, 65-91 (1981)
  46. “Optimal Spatial Location Under Pollution: Liability Rules and Zoning, with M. White, Journal of Legal Studies,249-268 (1981).
  47. “First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of Coming to the Nuisance,” Journal of Legal Studies, 557-568 (1980).
  48. “A Diagrammatic Exposition of Justice,” Theory and Decision, 207-237 (1979).
  49. “How a War Ends,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 743-763 (1979). Reprinted in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.)Economics of Conflict,  Elgar (2003)
  50. “Candidates with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model,” Journal of Economic Theory, 180-189 (1977).
  51. “Prior Regulation vs. Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring,” Journal of Legal Studies, 193-211 (1977).
  52. “Estimating Voter Participation,” by D. Ashenfelter and S. Kelley, comment. Journal of Law and Economics, 735-741 (1976).
  53. “The Politics of Medical Inflation,” (with T. Marmor and T. Heagy), Journal of Health Politics and Law, (1976).
    • Reprinted in Ingeborg Mauksch (ed.), National Health Insurance(1979). 
    • Reprinted in Theodore Marmor, Jon Christianson, Health Care Policy: A Political Economy Approach, Sage, (1982).
  54. “Various Concepts of Power: Equivalence Among Ostensibly Unrelated Approaches,” British Journal of Political Science, 29-462 (1976).
  55. “Punishment as Retribution,” Theory and Decision, 209-237 (1974).
  56. “Two Views of Procedure,” Journal of Legal Studies, 249-256 (1974).
  57. “Optimal Cheating and Control,” with C. Nichols, Public Choice,  (1973).
  58. “Parties as Utility Maximizers,” American Political Science Review, 490 -498 (1973).
    • Spanish translation, “Los Partidos, Como Maximizadores de Utilidad” in Joaquin Velasco del Mazo (ed.), Democracia y Economia Politica, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 1980.

Chapters in Books

  1.  “Ex Ante vs Ex Post” in Francesco Parisi (ed.)Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. 2017.
  2. “The end of special interests theory and the beginning of a more positive view of democratic politics” in E. Balleisen and D. Moss (eds.) Toward a New Theory of Regulation, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
  3. “Theocracy and the evolution of morals” In: Ferrero, M., Wintrobe, R. (eds) The Political Economy of Theocracy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 2008
  4. “The power to propose versus the power to oppose.” In Braham and Steffan (eds) Power, Freedom and Voting, Springer 2008
  5. “Hobbes and the Political Economy of Power.” In Gosselin and Marciano (eds.) Democracy, Freedom and Coercion, 2007.
  6. “The Reach of Political Economy” with Barry Weingast in Weingast and Wittman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, 2006.
    • Reprinted in Robert Goodin (ed.) Handbook of Political Science. Oxford. 2009.
  7. “Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters,” Encyclopedia of  Public Choice, Charles Rowley and Fritz Schneider (eds.) Kluwer, 2004.
  8. “Efficiency of Democracy,” Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Charles Rowley and Fritz Schneider (eds.) Kluwer, 2004.
  9. “Public Finance without Guilt: Why Normative Public Finance is Positive Public Finance,” in Political Economy and Public Finance. S. Winer and H. Shibata (eds.) Edgar Elgar, 2003.
  10. “Comment on William Niskanen, ‘On the origin and identification of government failure’,” in Political Economy and Public Finance, S. Winer and H. Shibata (eds.) Edgar Elgar, 2003.’
  11. “When does Altruism Overcome the Intransitivity of Income Distribution?” in Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics, Albert Breton et. al. (eds.)  Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  12. “General Structure of the Law” in Encyclopedia of Law and  Economics, Edward Elgar Press, 2000.
  13. “Political Parties, Pressure Groups, and Democracy: A Transaction Cost Theory of Political Institutions” in Samuel Bowles, Maurizio Francine and Ugo Pagano (eds.) The Politics and Economics of Power. Routledge, 1999.
  14. “Contest Design and the Objective of the Contest Designer,” co-authored with N.r Singh in M. Baye (ed.) Advances in Applied Microeconomics,Volume 7, Greenwich, CT, 1998.
  15. “Last Clear Chance” in The New Palsgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan, 1998.
  16. “Coming to the Nuisance” in The New Palsgrave Dictionary of  Economics  and the Law, Macmillan, 1998.
    • Reprinted in D. Wittman (ed.) Readings in the Economic Analysis of Law, Blackwell, 2003.
  17. “The Good Samaritan Rule” in The New Palsgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan, 1998.
  18. “Liability for Harm versus Restitution for Benefit” in The New Palsgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan, 1998.
  19. “Term Limits as Political Redistribution” with Daniel Friedman in B. Grofman (ed.) Legislative Term Limits: A Public Choice  Perspective, Kluwer (1996)
  20. “Contrasting Economic and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice: An Economist’s Perspective on Why Cognitive Psychology does not Explain Democratic Politics” in Kristen Monroe (ed.) The Economic Approach to Politics, Harper Collins (1991)
  21. “Spatial Strategies when Candidates have Policy Preferences,” in J. Enelow and M. Hinich (eds.) Readings in the Spatial Theory of  Voting, Cambridge University Press (1990).
  22. “An Economic Analysis of the Federalist Papers: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract,” in B. Grofman and D. Wittman (eds.) The Federalist Papers: The New Institutionalism and the Old, Agathon Press, 1989.
  23. “Elections with N Voters, M Candidates and K Issues,” in M. Holler (ed.) The Logic of Multiparty Systems Kluwer (1987)
  24. “Markets as Poolers of Information,” in B. Grofman and G. Owen (eds.) Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, JAI Press 1986.
  25. “A Priori Probabilities of Coalition Formation and Power Measurement,” in Manfred Holler, (Ed.) Coalition and Collective Action, Physics-Verlag, 1984.
  26. “Zoning May Be No Worse Than its Alternatives,” with R. Grieson in R. Grieson, (Ed.), Housing and Urban Economics,  Lexington Heath, 1982.
  27. “Power in Ideological Space,” in M. Holler (ed.), Power, Voting, and Voting Power, Physica-Verlag, 1982.
  28. “Equivalent Concepts of Power,” in M. Holler (ed.), Power, Voting, and Voting Power, Physica-Verlag, 1982.
  29. “Short Run vs. Long Run Solutions to Spatial Externalities,” with M. White,  in D. Rubenfeld (Ed.), Law and Economics of Local Government, Urban Institute 1980.
  30. “Power in Electoral Games,” in C.A. Hooker (Ed.),  Foundations of Decision Theory, Reidel, 1978.
  31. “Politics, Public Policy and Medical Inflation,” with T. Marmor and T. Heagy, in Michael Zubkoff (ed.),  Health Care Inflation, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1976.
  32. “Political Decision Making,” in Robert D. Leiter, Gerald Sirkin (Eds.), Economics of Public Choice, Cyrco Press, 1975.

Reviews

  1. “What is Wrong with Phelps’s Analysis of the West’s Economies?” Homo Oeconomicus (2016) 33: 51
  2. “The Myth of the Rational Voter?” Critical Review, 2008.
  3. “Mancur Olson. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships,” The Annals of Political and Social Sciences, 2000.
  4. “Albert Breton. Competitive Governments,” Southern Economic Journal, 1998.
  5. “William Keech. Economic Politics,” Governance, April 1996, 9:242-4.
  6. “Charles Wolf, Jr., Markets or Governments: Choosing between Imperfect Alternatives,” Public Choice, 1989.
  7. “Kenneth Boulding, The Economics of Love and Fear,” Public Choice, 1974.